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The President's Power to Exempt a Foreign
Nation From Local Taxation
United States v. Arlington
669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982)
On September 6, 1978, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia declared that an apartment build-
ing owned by the diplomatic mission of the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany) and used to house its staff and their
families was subject to a lien for unpaid taxes. The Attorney Gen-
eral, at the request of the Department of State, filed this action
requesting: (1) a declaratory judgment that the apartment building
was exempt from real estate taxes; (2) a voiding of all assessments
and liens affecting the property; and (3) an injunction prohibiting
Arlington County from making further attempts to collect taxes
from the property or its owner. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia held that the county could not assess taxes on
the property after May 4, 1979, but that the property was subject
to a tax lien for 1977, 1978, and part of 1979. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, holding: (1) the State Department was empowered
to enter into an agreement with the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) exempting from taxation property used for diplomatic pur-
poses; (2) the agreement was not an unconstitutional infringement
on the county's power to tax; and (3) the GDR is immune from
execution of the tax lien.
The United States officially recognized the GDR on Septem-
ber 4, 1974 (1974 agreement), at which time the two nations agreed
to establish bilateral diplomatic relations.1 In 1976, the GDR pur-
chased an apartment building in Arlington County, Virginia to
house its diplomatic staff and their families.
In 1978, Arlington County brought an action against the GDR
to recover unpaid taxes on the apartment building. The GDR
made a special appearance contending that it is immune from the
jurisdiction of the district court. The court determined that it had
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because
1. Agreement on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, Sept. 4, 1974, United States-
German Democratic Republic, 25 U.S.T. 2597, T.I.A.S. No. 7937.
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the GDR's use of the property was of a commercial nature and
because the action placed in issue rights in immovable property.2
Notwithstanding, the GDR stood on their plea of lack of jurisdic-
tion and raised no further defense. As a result, the court entered
judgment against the GDR for the taxes due and declared a tax
lien against the apartment building.
3
In response, the State Department entered into an agreement
with the GDR on May 4, 1979 (1979 agreement), which provided
for the:
reciprocal exemption from real estate taxes for property owned
(by either country) when such property is used exclusively for
purposes of their diplomatic missions, including residences for
the staff of their diplomatic missions and members of their
family."
Despite the existence of this agreement the county continued to
tax the property.' Consequently, the Attorney General brought
this action.
One of the county's principal contentions was that the State
Department did not have the power to enter into the 1979 agree-
ment creating the tax exemption. The court of appeals addressed
this contention by determining that the 1974 agreement was a
valid exercise of the power of the Executive Branch to recognize
foreign governments. The court based its decision on the Presi-
dent's Constitutional powers in foreign relations, as articulated in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States.' The court further held that
this power is not limited solely to recognition, but includes the
power to augment an agreement with whatever terms are necessary
to complete and effectuate the recognition. The court's authority
2. 669 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1982). The court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 1981)
which provides in part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state.
(4) in which rights . . . in immovable property situated in the United
States are in issue.
3. 669 F.2d 925, 936 (4th Cir. 1982).
4. Id. at 936.
5. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia did not publish their opinion.
6. 304 U.S. 126, 137-138 (1938).
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here was United States v. Belmont7 and United States v. Pink,6
cases upholding the Litvinov Assignment.' In addition to recogniz-
ing the Soviet Union, the Litvinov Assignment recognized the So-
viet Union, but also provided for the settlement of claims against
the Soviet Union as a condition to recognition. The Court in Pink
stated: "[P]ower to remove such obstacles to full recognition as
settlement of claims . . . is a modest implied power of the Presi-
dent. . ... ,0e The court in the instant case implied an identical
power holding that the 1979 agreement for tax exemptions was
"ancillary to the 1974 agreement for the recognition of the GDR""
and was therefore a valid exercise of the President's power to aug-
ment recognition. The ancillary agreement however, did not arise
until five years after recognition, whereas in Belmont and Pink,
the ancillary conditions arose simultaneously with the recognition.
The court found that the Diplomatic Relations Act of 197812
provided an additional source of power for this executive agree-
ment. With this Act, Congress empowered the President to grant
privileges and immunities to members of the diplomatic corps of
foreign states. Literally, the Act grants privileges and immunities
only to persons who are diplomats. The court, however, found that
an immunity granted to a diplomat is merely a by-product of the
immunity which is conferred on the government he represents.
Thus, the Act was deemed to empower the President to confer
privileges and immunities on foreign states with which the United
States has established diplomatic relations. Since the GDR is such
a state, the President had the statutory power to grant it the privi-
lege of tax exemption.
The county's next principal contention was that even assum-
7. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
8. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
9. See BEVANS, 11 TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1776-1949, 1248 (1974).
10. 315 U.S. at 229-230. See also Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231(2d Cir.
1951), where Judge Learned Hand stated:
The constitutional power of the President extends to the settlement of mu-
tual claims between a foreign government and the United States, at least when it
is an incident to the recognition of that government; and it would be unreasona-
ble to circumscribe it to such controversies. The continued mutual amity be-
tween the nation and other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory
compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such compromises
has existed from the earliest times and been exercised by the offices of all civi-
lized nations.
11. 669 F.2d at 930.
12. 22 U.S.C. §254(c)(1979).
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ing that the State Department was empowered to enact the 1979
agreement, only the State of Virginia could exempt the property of
a foreign government from taxation. Speaking to this contention,
the court expounded on the Federal Government's exclusive pow-
ers over foreign or external affairs. The United States Government
can exercise these powers free from restrictions which might other-
wise be imposed by state laws and policies. The court again relied
on United States v. Belmont. There the United States attempted
to recover money deposited by a Russian corporation in a New
York bank, pursuant to the Litvinov Assignment."3 Subsequent to
the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union nationalized all corpora-
tions in their country. As a condition to U.S. recognition, the Litvi-
nov Assignment required the U.S.S.R. to assign to the United
States claims that it had acquired as a result of the nationalization
of property held by U.S. nationals. The Second Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
reasoning that allowance of recovery of the claim would have been
contrary to New York's laws and policies against confiscation.14
The Supreme Court reversed, and held that the agreement for the
recognition of the Soviet Union, with the conditions incident
thereto, was an executive agreement which should be viewed as
tantamount to a treaty, in the sense that it is the "supreme Law of
the Land," against which no state law can prevail.15 In the instant
case, the 1974 and 1979 agreements combined to form an executive
agreement recognizing the GDR, not unlike the Litvinov Assign-
ment. The court of appeals held that the two agreements were to
be "accorded the dignity of formal treaties," thus becoming the
"Law of the Land," and the county's power to tax would have to
yield to the State Department's power to recognize the GDR and
to grant privileges and immunities in furtherance thereof. 6
The third major issue which the court addressed" was
whether the GDR was immune from execution of a tax lien which
had been declared against the apartment house for 1977, 1978, and
13. Supra note 7.
14. 85 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1936).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
16. 669 F.2d at 932.
17. Two minor issues raised by Arlington County were: (1) whether the U.S. had to join
the GDR in this action; and (2) whether the U.S. should be estopped from litigating the
issue of the tax status of the property prior to May 4, 1979, since that issue had been de-




part of 1979. Section 1609 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 197618 provides that the property "of a foreign state shall be
immune from ...execution except as provided in section 1610
." The relevant exceptions provided in section 1610 are:
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state,
* . . used for a commercial activity .. .shall not be immune
from .. .execution . . .if
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial ac-
tivity upon which the claim is based, or
(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing
rights in property-
(B) which is immovable and situated in the
United States: Provided, That such property is not used for pur-
poses of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the res-
idence of the Chief of such mission .... 19
Section 1610 applies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
as enunciated in the Tate Letter to immunity from attachment
and execution. 0 Under this theory, the "immunity of the sovereign
is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii)
of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis)."1
The county contended that the property was being used for
commercial uses prior to the 1979 agreement, and therefore its use
was jure gestionis, and pursuant to §1610(a)(2), not immune from
execution of the tax liens. The court's response was that, regardless
of what took place prior to that agreement, the record indicated
that after May 4, 1979 (the day the agreement was entered into)
the property was being used exclusively by the diplomatic staff and
their families. Therefore, from that date the use of the apartment
building was jure imperii, and the property was immune from exe-
cution of any tax liens to which it might have been subjected, at
least insofar as § 1610(a)(2) is applicable.
2
1
The court next addressed the question of whether the apart-
ment building used to house the diplomatic staff of the GDR was
immune from execution of the tax lien in light of § 1610(a)(4)(B)
18. 28 U.S.C. §1609 (Supp. 1981).
19. 28 U.S.C. §1610(a) (Supp. 1981).
20. 6 G.M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 569 (1968).
21. Id.
22. 669 F.2d at 934.
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which excepts from immunity property "used for purposes of
maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of
the Chief of such mission . . ..,2" The court resolved this issue by
applying the doctrine of Mexico v. Hoffman, " which required
courts to weigh heavily a determination by the State Department
as to whether immunity should be granted. The court held that the
State Department did make such a determination and this is im-
plicit in the 1979 agreement.2 5 Specifically, the 1979 agreement
provided for the reciprocal exemption from taxation of property
"used exclusively for purposes of their diplomatic missions, includ-
ing residences for their staff. . . ." When this language is viewed
in the light of section 1610(a)(4)(B), it becomes clear that the
State Department must have believed that the housing of a diplo-
matic staff was a use of property for the purpose of "maintaing a
diplomatic or consular mission." Therefore, the immunity from ex-
ecution provided for in section 1609 can be applied to the tax lien
against the apartment building.
The scope of the President's power to enter into independent
executive agreements has been the subject of much debate. In Cur-
tiss- Wright Export Corp. the Supreme Court found that the Presi-
dent has an inherent power in foreign affairs.2 This inherent
power enables the President to negotiate an executive agreement
without congressional approval and without the need to rely on a
substantive grant of power in the Constitution, such as his position
as Commander in Chief or his recognition powers. In Pink and
Belmont the Court reinforced the concept of inherent powers when
it upheld the Litvinov Assignment based on the President's au-
thority as the "sole organ" of the government in foreign affairs.
2 7
The Court adapted this analysis even though it could have found
authority for the agreement in the President's recognition power.1
8
During the Vietnam era, many began to fear that the Presi-
dent had too much power in foreign affairs. These fears arose as a
result of the commitment by the President of troops to the conflict
in Southeast Asia. One writer poses this question:
Would "the people" approve the presidential revision [of the
23. 28 U.S.C. §1610(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1981).
24. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
25. 669 F.2d at 934.
26. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
27. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
28. L. HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFARS AND THE CONSTIrtUON 178 (1972).
[Vol. 14:3
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distribution of power] whereunder the President claims, acting
alone, to commit us to a Vietnam war, if they were told that the
bloodletting is justified, not by the Constitutional text nor by
the framers (which runs to the contrary) but by a boot-strap
theory of power built upon successive usurpations?"
The court in the instant case has embraced some of these fears
and, in response, has refused to view the President as having ex-
pansive inherent powers in foreign affairs. Its basis for upholding
the reciprocal tax exemption agreement was that it was ancillary to
the recognition of the GDR, thus specifically relying on the Presi-
dent's substantive power of recognition."0 The interesting aspect of
this analysis is that the agreement was not a part of the initial
recognition package, but rather it arose five years after recognition
had been completed. Thus, the court had to stretch the President's
recognition power in order to use it to support the agreement,
when it would have been more feasible to uphold the agreement
based on the President's inherent foreign affairs powers. Moreover,
the court indicated its lack of support of a broad presidential
power to conclude agreements by relying on the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act to "buttress" its holding.81 Had it been willing to view
the President as having expansive independent powers it would
not have developed a line of reasoning which provides congres-
sional authorization for the agreement. The court's rationale may
have been the result of the Supreme Court decision in Dames and
Moore v. Regan, wherein the Court declined to support the posi-
tion that the President has broad inherent powers for indepen-
dently negotiating executive agreements.
32
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29. Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. Rsv. 1, 53
(1972). Berger's question was addressed directly to the issue of the independent actions of
the President, but it still reflects the sentiment surrounding his powers in foreign affairs.
30. 669 F.2d at 930.
31. Id.
32. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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